

Security and Intelligence Challenges in Guinea-Bissau, Africa's Narco-State and Issues Beyond Borders

Dr. Temitope Francis Abiodun

Department of Peace, Security and Humanitarian Studies
Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies
University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Dr. Joshua Olatunde Fajimbola

Department of History and International Relations
Faculty of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences
Elizade University, Ilara-Mokin,
Ondo State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the international security concerns in relation to the disquiets in the tiny West African state, Guinea-Bissau since independence. The country famously known as “narco-state” faces formidable challenges with weak governance negatively impacting on intelligence services. Intelligence and security reform is a building block of democracy, but this has been habitually weakened in Guinea-Bissau during the last four decades. The state remains one of the most fragile nations in the world having had its security culture totally perturbed, occasioned by the military rule since independence from Portugal in 1974. With over nine coup d'états that have been staged with a number of state administrations toppled coupled with an avalanche of internal conflicts, and prevalence of transnational phenomena (cocaine trafficking), and other traditional state-based challenges, the African narco-state has been left with a very weak governance structure, security, and intelligence services. The study examines Guinea-Bissau's intelligence culture drawing from secondary sources to understand how intelligence has been shaped and how intelligence has influenced the country in the context of poverty and authoritarianism. The study examines the various factors that have shaped the state's intelligence, analyzing the transformation and reform in the state's defense and security sector. It provides recommendations so the Bissau-Guinean intelligence community can be more effective. This study uses secondary sources and makes use of descriptive and content analyses techniques.

Keywords: International Security, Intelligence community, Narco-state, Guinea-Bissau, Africa.

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is a state that is situated on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, neighboring Guinea Conakry for 421 km and the Cassamance region of Senegal for 341 km. The nation's borders enclose 28.120 km² of land area and 8.005 km² of water area, for a total of 36.125 km². In the same vein, over 1, 759, 159 Guineans live in the country while about one-third of the population dwells in the capital city of Bissau (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

And being a legacy of the colonial masters, the official language of the Guinea-Bissau remains Portuguese while Creole is the main spoken language, with the Pular and the Mandingo respectively (Smith, 2008). In terms of religion, 50 percent of Guinea-Bissauans are Muslims, 40 percent are traditional adherents and the remaining 10 percent are Christians. The small nation is composed of eleven ethnic groups including: Fulani (as 28.5 percent of the population), Balanta (22.5 percent), and Mandinga (14.7 percent) respectively (Smith, 2008). The ethnic construction is complex and has had a consistent role in the political history of Guinea-Bissau while economically, the country ranks 178th out of 188 states in the Human Development Index 2016 within the industries of agriculture, forestry and fishing; large deposits of resources and power; manufacturing (local products of basketry, blacksmithing among others) labor and taxation; transportation and telecommunications; with 67% of the population living below the poverty line (Human Development Index, 2016).

Guinea-Bissau, a tiny West African state is tagged a narco-state as a result of government officials often bribed by drug traffickers to escape being arrested or for the government to ignore the illegal trade. The early post-colonial political history had a significant impact on the country. Amilcar Cabral and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) led the successful liberation war from Portuguese colonial rule between 1961 and 1974 and built a strong narrative of collective identity and national cohesion (Ibrahim, 2020). A timeline of some of the key moments in the nation's history of coups would attest to the political instability in the state as follows: in September 10, 1974 after more than eleven (11) years of war with Portugal and the toppling of Portugal's authoritarian dictatorship, Guinea-Bissau was eventually granted an independence by Portugal in 1974 and Luis Cabral became Guinea-Bissau's first president in November 14, 1980, while Cabral was overthrown by Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira during a bloodless coup. June 7, 1998 (Ibrahim, 2020).

Also, there was another military coup that was led by General Ansumane Mane but failed in May 7, 1999 and the military overthrew President Vieira and Malam Bacai became an interim president. In November 28, 1999, Kumba Yala won the next presidential election. Also in September 14, 2003, the military seized power and overthrew Yala; and in July 24, 2005, the former President Vieira won the election that came up thereafter (ibid). However in March 2, 2009, Vieira was brutally murdered by military militias; and Raimundo Pereira became interim leader.⁵ In the same vein in June 5, 2009, the Military police killed several politicians in what they tagged an attempted coup while in July 29, 2009, Malam Bacai Sanha won the presidential election that came up thereafter. By the way in January 9, 2012; President Malam Bacai Sanha died of natural causes (he was diagnosed of diabetis) in Paris, France; and as a result of this, Raimundo Pereira became a president. Meanwhile in March 2012, a Presidential election scheduled to be conducted, but disrupted by another military coup (Defaria, 2012).

Guinea-Bissau is a montage of ethnic and religious groups and the state is currently being led by President Umaro Sissoco Embaló; he was born in Bissau on September 23, 1972. President Embaló is a political scientist; holds a degree in International Relations from the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences at the Technical University of Lisbon, as well as both a master's degree in Political Science and a Doctorate in International Relations from the Complutense University of Madrid (CNN Report, 2012). He is very fluent in Portuguese and Spanish, and competent in English, French, Arabic and Swahili. Umaro Embaló served in the military and also as a Prime Minister between November 18, 2016 and January 16, 2018. He

served in the military, undertaking National Defense Studies at the National Defense Center of Spain, and underwent further studies on National Security in Brussels, Tel Aviv, Johannesburg, Japan and Paris (Kohnert, 2019).

Umaro Sissoko Embaló later rose to the rank of Brigadier-General. However, before his political career, he academically specialized in African and Middle-Eastern affairs and in matters of defence, international co-operation and development (Kohnert, 2019). He is a former Minister of African Affairs. He initially formed his cabinet on December 13, 2016 having been appointed a Prime Minister by the former President José Mário Vaz on November 18, 2016. Thereafter, Umaro Embaló took the position while under a boycott of his own party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which through its Central Committee gave him a vote of distrust of one hundred and twelve votes in favor and eleven against on November 26, 2016. As head of government, he was only able count on the support of the Social Renovation Party, which had the second largest number of seats in the National People's Congress of Guinea-Bissau (ibid).

After disagreements with President José Mário Vaz 13 January, 2018, he was replaced according to the demands of João Fadiá (Minister of Finance) and Botche Candé (Minister of the Interior), and Embaló requested his resignation from the position, effective on 16 January 2018. Meanwhile in 2019, Umaro Sissoko Embaló contested for the post of president, as the candidate of Madem G15 (Clayton, 2020). He finished in second place with 27% of the vote in the first round of voting.

In accordance with the preliminary and final results released by the National Commission of Elections, he won the run-off vote against another ex- Prime-Minister, Domingos Simões Pereira. However, the final results continue to be disputed by his opponent Domingos Simões Pereira; and neither the Supreme Court of Guinea-Bissau nor the parliament gave its approval for the official swearing-in ceremony (Clayton, 2020). Thereafter, Umaro Sissoko Embaló organized an alternative swearing-in ceremony in a hotel in Bissau and announced himself as legal president in the state. Although several politicians in Guinea-Bissau, including prime minister Aristides Gomes, accused Sissoco Embaló of arranging a Coup d'état, although outgoing president Mário Vaz stepped down to allow Embaló to take power while the ECOWAS has officially recognized Embaló's victory and demanded the formation of a government based on the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections (Kitney, 2017).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This study examines Guinea-Bissau's intelligence culture drawing from secondary sources to understand how intelligence has been shaped and how intelligence has influenced the country in the context of poverty and authoritarianism. It argues Guinea-Bissau faces numerous security challenges from domestic and foreign actors and problems are compounded with weak governance that negatively affects the country's intelligence culture. The paper is organized in five sections. It begins by discussing the relationship of Guinea-Bissau with other states in the international arena; secondly, it briefly discusses the four key components in intelligence community to understand the current intelligence structure and services. Next, it explores the historical use of intelligence in Guinea-Bissau with attention to security threats. Then it probes the intelligence community with specific security threats and government responses. Lastly, it explores intelligence oversight, intelligence reform and foreign partners.

GUINEA-BISSAUAN RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ARENA

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau in relations with other states in the global arena maintains a non-aligned foreign policy and usually seeks friendly and cooperative relations with numerous states and organizations (LLC Helix Consulting, 2018). Although, Guinea-Bissau enjoys bilateral relations with countries like; Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaija, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, East Timor, Egypt, France, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Kosovo, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nigeria, Portugal, Romania, Russia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, and Vietnam; nevertheless, some of these countries considered security situation in Guinea-Bissau as highly disturbing (Kohl, 2015).

That is the major reason the countries; Cuba, Angola, France, Portugal, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Russia establishes diplomatic offices in Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau also belongs to several international organizations of; the United Nations and many of its specialized and related agencies, and the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Group of 77, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Also, Guinea-Bissau is also a member of the African Development Bank (AFDB), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the African Union (AU), and the permanent Interstate Committee for drought control in the Sahel (CILSS) respectively (MacQueen, 2006).

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau remains a bonafide member of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), among others (MacQueen, 2006). It has established bilateral and multilateral relations with various states in such areas as trade, culture and education, and technology transfer, among others. Cooperation with Portugal has also increased in recent years. Prior to the Rio Conference, the government of Guinea-Bissau engaged itself in signing numerous cooperation agreements with international organizations working in the area of environment and sustainable development, and they include; the UNESCO, FAO, the Inter State Committee for Combating Desertification in the Sahel (CILSS), among others. As a result of her per capita income of \$202 US as at September 1997, a high poverty rate, and a low Gross National Product of \$240 US, Guinea-Bissau is rated among the least developed countries and extremely dependent on development assistance, from the various international financial agencies and the international community. In the absence of the global assistance, the tiny state, Guinea-Bissau would definitely find it difficult to implement most of its infrastructural projects (Mendy, Lobban, Richard, 2013).

Moreover, the country was engaged in a programme for economic stabilization based on a freer economy, and as well the increased credit for trade, particularly exports, among others, that was put in place and implemented in 1983, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also, in the field of fisheries, Guinea-Bissau established new cooperation several links aimed at strengthening both technical and financial cooperation for capacity building in order to promote the industry and ensure the sustainable use of its marine resources, all in a bid to achieve food security (National Implementation of Agenda 21, 1997). Also on the cooperation with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Guinea-Bissau has

officially signed agreements with countries; Portugal and Cape Verde in the areas of research, training, and institutional strengthening (National Implementation of Agenda 21, 1997). And in her effort to ensure global health strategy by providing good health care services and access for all the citizenry, the government of Guinea-Bissau, through the Ministry of Public Health, has been carrying out as immunization campaigns, among others projects (Mendy, Lobban, Richard, 2013). Besides, the Guinea-Bissauan Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Traditional Arts (MTAA) in 1995 ignited an elaborate Plan for Urban Solid Wastes to promote the campaign on waste reduction in the state capital, in collaboration with capital's Municipal Council and other governmental and non-governmental organizations. However, a lot of issues on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea remain highly significant to Guinea-Bissau. These include the integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including exclusive economic zones; the protection of the marine environment; regional and international cooperation and coordination; and the sustainable development of the parks located in the coastal area of the country (National Implementation of Agenda 21, 1997).

NOTABLE GUINEA-BISSAUAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The country's intelligence services are in four sectors each with a different bureaucratic objective. The first is the Intelligence Services of the Ministry of Interior. This institution carries out intelligence collection for internal security, including arresting suspects who threaten national security (Ministry of Internal Administration, 2020). The second is intelligence in the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and National Air Force). The Army Forces' structure changed little since independence and had a symbiotic relationship with the political institutions. The political role of the Armed Forces is formally acknowledged in the 1991 Constitution, which explains "It shall be incumbent on the People's Revolutionary Military Forces (FARP), as instrumental of national liberation in the service of the people and the primary institution for defending the Nation, to defend territorial independence, sovereignty, and integrity, and to cooperate strictly with specific national services in order to guarantee and maintain internal security and public order." The Army has 4,000; Navy 350; and National Air Force 100 personnel respectively (Ministry of Internal Administration, 2020).

The third is law enforcement intelligence. The internal security forces did not threaten the constitutional order like the military, but they share a common past in the liberation struggle, and were similarly partisan under one-party rule after her independence (Ministry of Internal Administration, 2020). Part of the state's security sector reform program initiated in 2008 consolidated nine internal security and intelligence agencies managed by seven different ministries into four. These were Public Order Police (POP), under the Ministry of Internal Administration (MoIA); National Guard, a gendarmerie form of force in charge as well customs and border patrol, also under the MoIA; Judiciary Police, mandated to investigate major crimes, also administering the Transnational Crime Unit, reporting to the Ministry of Justice, and State Information Services which works on and gather intelligence in safeguarding the office of the Prime Minister (*ibid*).

Fourth, the Ministry of Justice - while not having an intelligence service—plays a significant role in intelligence culture. A 2015 analysis of the Justice sector, carried out by the Ministry of Justice with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Guinea-Bissau, at the request of the Country Office, assisted in strengthening the rule of law in crisis-affected and fragile situations (UNDP Report, 2015). The Organization's assistance and support actually identified

the major hindrances of; lack of an independent and transparent judicial system; unreliable judicial system and; poor access to justice. The state has two prison facilities located outside the capital, Bissau which were re-opened in year 2011 after being rehabilitated by the European Union (EU) and United Nations Integrated Peace building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and a detention facility within Fourth, the Ministry of Justice—while not having an intelligence service—plays a significant role in intelligence culture (International Strategic Studies, 2020). The study, therefore, is poised to interrogate intelligence services activities in the Offices of the President and also that of Prime Minister of Guinea-Bissau.

OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE USE IN GUINEA-BISSAU

Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest states in the world. The politics of Guinea-Bissau is hinged on a structure of a semi-presidential representative democratic republic, with a multi-party system, in which the President serves as head of state while the Prime Minister remains head of government (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020). Executive power is unilaterally exercised by the government while legislation is vested in both the government and the National People's Assembly. Meanwhile in post-colonial stance and most especially since 1994, the party system in the country has always been controlled by the socialist African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde and the Party for Social Renewal; but the judiciary remains independent of the executive and the legislature (Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016). However, the democratic, constitutional framework, the military has exercised substantial power, and has interfered repeatedly in civilian leadership since multi-party elections were instituted in 1994. Therefore, in the last two decades, Guinea-Bissau has experienced two coups, a civil war, an attempted coup, and a presidential assassination by the military forces and in the history of the nation's independence in 1974, only one president, Jose Mario Vaz, has been able to successfully completed his five-year term (Embaló, 2011).

Also in the past, there have been instances of the situation where State Intelligences Services were used against the public and others by the people in government of Guinea-Bissau (Homer, 2014). There is an of the gesture on March 11 2008 when a journalist and Director of Ultima Hora newspaper, Atizar Mendes Pereira, was arrested and detained by the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Interior of Guinea Bissau (Embaló, 2011). The said arrest was pursuant to a purported publication of an article in which revealed that the Chief of Staff of the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces, General Baptista Tagme Nawaie, intended to disarm the men from the police stations in Bissau. He was subjected to some inhuman treatment and torture for six hours before being finally released (Homer, 2014).

The country has faced numerous domestic security lapses and failures. Though traditional state-based security challenges were identified and most serious threats to Guinea-Bissau's security come increasingly from transnational phenomena (MFWA Report, 2008, GIATOC Report, 2012). Moreover, the absence of the police in larger provinces of the state, weak or strained border control management and insufficient operational capabilities to patrol the state make it more challenging for the government to combat transnational criminal networks involved on drug trafficking, timber, and arms proliferation as well as on tackling the trafficking or smuggling of people across the nation's borders (Abiodun and Abioro, 2020; Carlota, 2015). Consequently, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is co-located with the United Nations Integrated Peace building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, including Spain, Portugal, and Brazil (Carlota, 2015).

However, intelligence, politics and crime are intertwined in the country. This is evident when hours after citizens voted peacefully in the March 19, 2012 presidential election, Guinea-Bissau's former military intelligence chief, Colonel Samba Djalo was shot dead at a bar near his residence in the capital for political reasons (BBC News, 2012). Djalo's murder followed a sudden increase in political assassinations in the narco-state. Meanwhile, cocaine and drug smuggling in the country has always been mounting much pressure on the country's efforts in stemming the flow of drugs to Europe and the United States. However, a Court document that surfaced in year 2014 reveals that the loots seized in Guinea-Bissau's largest ever drug busted, was more than 20 vehicles, including a Mercedes Benz that was worth \$3m (£2.5m) and stashed in bank accounts, \$90,000 worth of porridge and wine found hidden in a warehouse, and 1.8 tons of cocaine kept in sacks (INTERPOL Report, 2018). Also with assistance of the Army Intelligence operations codenamed "Dubbed Operation Navara", a huge seizure of contrabands from twelve nationals from: Colombia, Mexico, Guinea-Bissau, Colombian and Portugal was made and culprits were all sentenced (INTERPOL Report, 2018).

Moreover, traffickers in Guinea-Bissau are usually corrupt and they operate criminal markets, generate large benefits for a few, at the expense of the masses. However, former Guinea-Bissauan Navy Chief, Bubo Na Tchuto, was paraded as one of the outstanding or high-profile government officials to have been convicted of drug trafficking in the state (INTERPOL Report, 2018). Meanwhile, having been involved in several failed coup attempts, he was designated a "drug kingpin" by the United States and was eventually arrested by its troops in a sting operation conducted off the West African coast in the 2013. After the arrest, the Ex-Army Chief, General Antonio Indjai, took over power amidst the "cocaine and narcotics coup" and in 2012 (ibid)

However, the Military has been wielding gargantuan influence in Guinea-Bissau for decades; and the usual ransacking of every nook and cranny aided the seizure in March 2019 of about 800kg of hard drugs that were hidden in a Senegalese-registered truck loaded with frozen fish in Safim town, which is nine (9) miles from the capital was a case in point.²⁰ After the investigations by the Intelligence Services, it was discovered that the drugs were actually on the way to al-Qaeda provinces in the Islamic Maghreb. It was also established that proceeds from drugs were usually deployed to fund election campaigns in Guinea-Bissau and the drug traffickers were well-entrenched in the region (INTERPOL Report, 2018). The syndicate has a leader named, Braima Seidi Ba, who doubles as a national of both Guinea-Bissau and Portugal and he usually operates between The Gambia, Guinea and Mali to evade capture. The other ringleader - Ricardo Ariza Monje, who is a national of both Mexico and Colombia, has since departed the nation for Latin America (ibid)

A GLANCE AT THE INTELLIGENCE CULTURE IN GUINEA-BISSAU

The Intelligence Community (IC) in Guinea-Bissau is composed of some agencies with various specific issues that shaped its intelligence culture; the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Interior; Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and National Air Force); Police (pursuant to the state's security sector reform program put in place in 2008, the nine (9) internal security and intelligence agencies were consolidated into four forces: *Public Order Police (POP)*, under the Ministry of Internal Administration (MoIA); *National Guard*, a gendarmerie type of force in charge as well of customs and border patrol, also under the MoIA; *Judiciary Police*, mandated to investigate major crimes, also hosting the Transnational Crime Unit, reporting to the Ministry

of Justice (MoJ), and State Information Services, a press agency, under the directive of the Prime Minister (Ministry of Internal Administration, 2020). The Intelligence Community of the state is shaped by these specific factors:

Though the US Department of States Report (2014), Lippert and Pfluke (2019) have evaluated Guinea Bissau as though being a low-threat state for terrorism either directed at Western states' interests or not but there are serious threats of transnational terrorism and insurgency by Boko Haram and Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) in West African region which would definitely spillover into Guinea-Bissau (Lippert and Pfluke, 2019). Without mincing words, there are specific security concerns in the poorly policed eastern areas of the country. It has become a tradition that foreigners are the main targets of crime in the country due to perceived wealth, not nationality.

Guinea-Bissau is adjudged to be a high-threat region for political, economic, religious, and ethnic violence in all sense (Amnesty International Report, 2016). This is evident in the case of armed resistance by the Movement of Democratic Forces of Cassamance (MFDC) directed against the Senegalese government remains a protracted separatist conflict in sub-Saharan Africa; and Movement of Democratic Forces of Cassamance (MFDC) rebels always use Guinea-Bissau as a haven. There was escalation of an armed conflict near the country's border in which several lives were claimed in March 2018 (Amnesty International Report, 2016). There have been unpredictable nature of political conflicts in the country mostly instigated by MFDC rebels, and this is the reason foreigners are usually advised to exercise caution when traveling in the northwestern region of country, most especially along the roads in; Varela, Mpack, and Sao Domingos. However, a presidential election was held in 2019 in Guinea-Bissau, though the international observers widely viewed the elections as credible, but the transition of power became spiteful and was characterized by an institutional incredibility in which the Army took a massive role (Amnesty International Report, 2016).

Drug trafficking since post-colonial era, has been exacerbating the stability of Guinea-Bissau; and the state is usually confirmed a transit point for narcotics trafficking to Europe and South America. The lack of enforcement capabilities, resources, porous borders, susceptibility to corruption and the state's location in relation to Europe, South America, and West Africa provides a favorable environment for traffickers (INTERPOL Report, 2018) However, various international drug cartels and other criminal syndicates usually made use of the routes without security presence, for instance, the un-policed Bijagos Archipelago, off the coast of the capital city of Bissau, as well as remote airstrips, for trafficking in drugs, arms, and persons. In addition, the drug traffickers deploy several methods of transportation including commercial and private aviation and maritime charters (INTERPOL Report, 2018).

INTERPOL's Incident Response Team (IIRT) also deployed intelligence experts in drug investigations, cybercrime, intelligence analysis, and financial crime to the country for assistance. The INTERPOL team deployed to Guinea Bissau supports national authorities in the investigation of the country's major drug seizures (INTERPOL Report, 2018). In 2020, police made ten arrests following the seizure of some 1.8 tons of cocaine transported by sea to the country's northwest province. The drug traffickers were found to have originated from Colombia, Guinea Bissau and Mali. The organized crime necessitated interventions of experts in drug investigations, cybercrime, intelligence analysis, and financial crime. INTERPOL's

Incident Response Team (IRT) was usually deployed at the request of Guinea Bissau's authorities, and the team was usually joined by officers from Brazil's Federal Police and Colombia's National Police, demonstrating the transnational nature of the investigation (INTERPOL Report, 2018).

Over the last decade, the urgency of security sector reform as a precondition of stability remained largely contained to political statements not backed by genuine political will in Guinea-Bissau (Davin and Peter, 2013). It is observed that both the political leadership and the armed forces have regarded security reform as a means for consolidating their respective positions. The armed forces often employ rhetoric of compliance in the security sector reform proposals, but this ends once the status quo is threatened, as illustrated by the abrupt closing of the EU-Security Sector Reform Guinea-Bissau mission (2008–2010). However, in recent years, some localized reform efforts were carried out mostly in the Police and justice spheres, in spite of delays following each major political crisis (Davin and Peter, 2013). However, state weakness or fragility and recurrent instability have hindered the sustainability of efforts in fostering the rule of law and building public institutions on a foundation of democratic governance that can be respected by the security sector.

The criminal justice system in Guinea-Bissau has been adjudged to be very weak and failing to guarantee due process in all sense. However in June, 2015, the United Nations Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers indicated that the justice system in Guinea-Bissau is sad and terrible due to lack of incompetence, corruption, lack of resources, impunity and limited access to justice as the major obstacles to judicial independence. The political instability in the country has hampered several vital reforms being put on hold, including upgrading Guinea-Bissau's only two prisons (Davin and Peter, 2013).

IMPACTS OF OVERSIGHT, REFORM, OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

The Guinea-Bissauan government in year 2006 expressed its vision for a holistic security sector reform process with a Strategy Document tagged "*Restructuring and Modernization of the Defense and Security Sector*". This strategy was, however, put in place in coordination with key strategy documents, including the National Poverty Reduction Strategy, which lists justice and security sector reform as the first of the government's priorities (Davin and Peter, 2013). Therefore, a national vision with an accompanying strategy for SSR was adopted as early as 2006 and significant donor attention was received to implement this strategy including the EU-Security Sector Reform Mission in Guinea Bissau (2008-2010) and the UNDP Global Program: Strengthening the Rule of Law in crisis-affected and fragile situations: a UNDP global program for justice and security (2012-2015) (Carlota, 2015).

The reform allowed for a realignment of the strategic mission of the Armed Forces towards maritime surveillance, protection of territorial integrity and focus on peace support operations. The level of education and training amongst the rank and file remains low, while the military appears to still be able to act outside both legal and civilian control (Davin and Peter, 2013). Meanwhile, there was irregular progress on re-building or rehabilitating the military infrastructure, with sharp differences in conditions among units and services, means that the source of previous tensions remains. As a result of the ongoing political stalemate in Bissau, personnel demobilization efforts have not gathered momentum. Resource mobilization has also

been an issue: \$24 million alone are required for pensioning off the first 500 military and police retirees (Walsh, 2020). In a bid for a more conducive political context, has the new mandatory military system that would provide for recruitment of new personnel in the basis of professional standards and operational needs.

A Model Police Station program has been developed to support the consolidation of the community and proximity policing approach, with the first model station being opened in Bissau in 2011 (Davin and Peter, 2013). The aim is actually meant to transform the prevalent militarized approach to policing, to foster effectiveness and coordination of law enforcement forces as well as to bring a meaningful gender lens to police reform, in order to address domestic and sexual and gender-based violence (ibid). On the other hand, innovative plans on this facade still fall short of the potential impacts; and the Specialized Gender and Children Units in the police stations work with severe restrictions (Walsh, 2020). The introduction of protection officers within POP stations, with the United Nations Integrated Peace building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) support, has not been responding to its expectation, and so is the on-call specialized brigade for women and children victims of violence within the Judiciary Police, which functions with severe limitations (Guinea-Bissauan Constitution, 1984 as amended in 1991).

The non-functional formal justice system in the state has been identified as a trigger of conflict on its own by different studies about the roots of conflict and violence in Guinea-Bissau, and therefore justice reform is crucial to consolidate peace and stability, needing robust components of peace building and conflict prevention on those efforts.(ibid) This understanding was again captured most recently in the National Justice Modernization and Reform Program (2015–2019), which in turn got fed into the drafting of the Peace and Governance component of the Strategic and Operational Plans of Terra Ranka spanning from 2015 and 2020 respectively. And the first robust program for justice reform in Guinea-Bissau started in 2007 with support from the EU under Program d'Appui aux Organes de Souveraineté et à l'Etat de Droit (PAOSSED).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has focused on the fact that Guinea-Bissau faces formidable challenges as far as international security is concerned with weak governance negatively impacting on her intelligence services; and it is discussed that both the intelligence and security reform usually taken as a building block of democracy, has been weakened and demoted to the back burner, with little impacts from the national police force in Guinea-Bissau in the last four decades. It is evident in the chapter the politicians in the tiny West African state of Guinea-Bissau have announced security reform to ensure the political stability. However, this great effort could only be attained when there is political will on the part of people in government and there is optimism that democratic principle, political dialogue, and national reconciliation will definitely improve the situations. Also, the inter-agency collaboration and sharing of security information among all the security agencies in the state should become more strengthened in overcoming the common threats from the country's borders. In addition, security and intelligence of the country could be more strengthened with modern equipment and drones used for surveillance activities.

References

Abiodun and Abioro, 2020. Roles and Challenges of International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) in Investigation of Crimes and Maintenance of Global Security. *Research Journal of Social Science and Management*, TIJ Publishers RJSSM, Vol. 10, Issue 3 (2251-1571). Singapore.

Aly, S. (2019). "Guinea-Bissau journalist severely beaten, tongue cut out" retrieved via www.africanews.com (Amnesty International Report, 2016)

BBC News (2012). "Guinea-Bissau ex-spy chief Samba Djalo shot dead," BBC, March 19
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17433557>

Carlota, A. (2015). "New strategic vision offers hope of stability for Guinea-Bissau." Retrieved via www.gisreportsonline.com on 12 January, 2021

Central Intelligence Agency (2021). "Guinea-Bissau," The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/guinea-bissau/>

Clayton, B. J. (2020). "Guinea Bissau election inspires optimism – but there are still big risks." Retrieved via www.theconversation.com

CNN Report (2012). "*Politics of Guinea-Bissau*". CNN. 16 April 2012. URL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Guinea-Bissau: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Guinea-Bissau-SSR-Background-Note><https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52569130>

Davin, O. and Peter, T. (2013). Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's First Narco-State. ACSS Special Report; a Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Guinea-Bissau SSR background Note. URL:<https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Guinea-Bissau-SSR-Background-Note>

Defaria, D. (2012), "Guinea-Bissau: Timeline of Coups". *Global Post* April 13, 2012 · 8:29 PM UTC. URL:
<https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-04-13/guinea-bissau-timeline-coups>.

Embaló, A. Y. (2011). "Guinea-Bissau says coup-plotter executed". AFP, retrieved 1 April, 2021.

GIATOC's Report (2012)

Guinea-Bissauan Constitution of 1984 (1991 as amended).

Horner, D. (2014). *The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO 1949–1963*, Vol. 1. Sydney: Allen and Unwinds, 2014.

Human Development Index 2016

Ibrahim, A. N. (2020). "Guinea-Bissau's political paralysis: Potential and risks of constitutional reform process". URL: <https://constitutionnet.org/news/guinea-bissaus-political-paralysis-potential-and-risks-constitutional-reform-process>

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2020), "Sub-Saharan Africa" *The Military Balance* 120, no. 1 (2020): 497

Institute for Strategic Studies (2016). "End the political instability in Guinea-Bissau." Retrieved via www.issafrica.org on 22 February, 2021.

INTERPOL Report (2018)

Kitney, G. (2017). "Politics and Policy Meet in New Home Affairs Department." *The Interpreter*, 2017 .

Kohnert, D. (2019). "Democratisation via elections in an African 'narco-state'? The case of Guinea-Bissau." Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften: hdl:10419/118635

Kohl, C. (2015). Guinea-Bissau's security sector: challenges and lessons. Retrieved

From <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/guinea-bissaus-security-sector-challenges-lessons/?location=guinea-bissau&theme=>

Lippert, K. Pfluke, Karl, 2019. "A History of the Five Eyes Alliance: Possibility for Reform and Additions." *Comparative Strategy* 38, no. 4 (2019): 302–315.

LLC Helix Consulting (2018). "Guinea-Bissau - Bilateral Relations - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia." *www.mfa.am*. Archived from the original on 24 January 2018. Retrieved 12 April, 21 2021.

MFWA Report (2008). "Journalist detained briefly, interrogated by intelligence services following publication of article on army's involvement in police force promotions Guinea-Bissau Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA). Retrieved: <https://www.pambazuka.org>

MacQueen, N. (2006). "Widening trajectories: Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde since independence". *Relações Internacionais*. Archived from the original on 23 April 2015. Retrieved 21 April, 2021.

Mendy, P. K.; Lobban, Jr., Richard, A. (2013). "Cape Verde, Relations with". *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 9780810880276. Retrieved 21 April, 2021.

Ministry of Internal Administration, 2020

National Implementation of Agenda 21 (1997). Information Provided by the Government of Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, 5th Session, 7-25 April 1997, New York

Smith, R. (2008). Summary and Conclusion. Report of the Review of Homeland and Border Security. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, December 2008.

UNDP Report (2015)

Walsh, P. (2020). "Improving 'Five Eyes' Healthy Security Intelligence Capabilities: Leadership and Governance Challenges. Intelligence and National Security." *Intelligence and National Security* 35, no. 4 (2020): 586–602.